Research

Research interests: Disclosure, Financial Institutions, Information Spillovers

Working Papers

Private Information Transmission by Lenders (Job Market Paper)

This paper examines whether private knowledge that banks acquire through lending relationships affects the investment decisions of other borrowers connected to the same lender. Using corporate acquisitions as a setting in which lead arrangers can become informed about borrowers’ strategic activities before public announcement, I find that industry peers sharing a lead arranger with the focal acquirer (“connected peers”) significantly increase investment in the quarter before the acquisition is announced. In contrast, peers without a shared lender respond only after the deal becomes public. Validation and falsification tests show that this differential response is concentrated around actual M&A announcements and does not arise around placebo announcement quarters or among peers of non-M&A focal firms. The results are also robust to pre-announcement media coverage and supply-chain relationships. Cross-sectional tests show stronger responses when the focal acquisition is more unexpected based on firm and industry acquisition histories and generates particularly positive announcement returns, assessed separately in stock and bond markets. The response is also stronger for acquisitions by industry leaders and for vertical acquisitions, when the common lender has greater industry expertise, when the peer’s loan is closer to maturity, and when the focal firm’s loan was originated more recently. Finally, connected peers are more likely to undertake subsequent acquisitions in related industries and do so sooner than unconnected peers. These findings provide evidence of a bank-intermediated information channel through which private knowledge developed in one lending relationship can shape other borrowers’ real decisions before the focal corporate action becomes public.

Cost Anchoring in Fair Value Estimation

We examine a previously unstudied bias in fair value estimation: cost anchoring. While the anchoring and adjustment bias is widely documented in experimental settings, little evidence exists as to whether anchoring in accounting measurement persists, or is consequential, in the real world. Using a uniquely granular dataset of insurance company investment holdings, we find variation in acquisition cost explains a significant amount of variation in fair value estimates across holders, within identical securities, on the same reporting dates. Cost anchoring persists when more timely information is publicly available as an input to fair value estimation, consistent with an insufficient adjustment from acquisition cost in valuation. Estimates exhibiting anchoring are less accurate and downwardly biased on average, inconsistent with incentives for opportunistic reporting. This bias appears to influence holders’ subsequent trading behavior with those anchoring on lower costs accepting lower prices when investments are sold. Based on our findings, we identify factors that can inform procedures to reduce cost anchoring in fair value estimation.

Work in Progress

Learning from the Shadows: How Public Firms Use Loan Disclosures to Inform Acquisition Decisions of Private Firms

This study examines whether regulatory disclosures from private lending relationships spill over to public acquisition market. Business Development Companies (BDCs) are specialized investment vehicles that provide financing to small- and middle-market private firms and, uniquely, are required by the SEC to publicly disclose standardized loan-level information, including loan terms, fair value adjustments, and performance updates. Leveraging this setting, I show that firms receiving BDC financing, and thus becoming publicly visible through mandated disclosures, are significantly more likely to be acquired by public firms. This effect is stronger when loan performance experiences significant changes – whether positive or negative – such as sharp movements in interest spreads, fair value marks, or payment status. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect varies with BDC characteristics, suggesting that features such as lender size, industry specialization, or screening ability influence how impactful the disclosures are for potential acquirers. Overall, the findings highlight a novel channel through which regulatory disclosure requirements in private credit markets influence acquisition decisions by public firms.