Private Information Transmission by Lenders (Job Market Paper)
This paper examines whether private knowledge that banks acquire through lending relationships affects the investment decisions of other borrowers connected to the same lender. Using corporate acquisitions as a setting in which lead arrangers can become informed about borrowers’ strategic activities before public announcement, I find that industry peers sharing a lead arranger with the focal acquirer (“connected peers”) significantly increase investment in the quarter before the acquisition is announced. In contrast, peers without a shared lender respond only after the deal becomes public. Validation and falsification tests show that this differential response is concentrated around actual M&A announcements and does not arise around placebo announcement quarters or among peers of non-M&A focal firms. The results are also robust to pre-announcement media coverage and supply-chain relationships. Cross-sectional tests show stronger responses when the focal acquisition is more unexpected based on firm and industry acquisition histories and generates particularly positive announcement returns, assessed separately in stock and bond markets. The response is also stronger for acquisitions by industry leaders and for vertical acquisitions, when the common lender has greater industry expertise, when the peer’s loan is closer to maturity, and when the focal firm’s loan was originated more recently. Finally, connected peers are more likely to undertake subsequent acquisitions in related industries and do so sooner than unconnected peers. These findings provide evidence of a bank-intermediated information channel through which private knowledge developed in one lending relationship can shape other borrowers’ real decisions before the focal corporate action becomes public.